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Abstract 
 
 
We examine quantitatively the extent to which financial distress in the 90s 
affected Japanese corporate investment. Based on the firm-level data that includes small, 
unlisted firms, we estimate investment function to measure the impact of financial 
distress on investment. We find that the firm’s ratio of debt to total asset exerts a 
significantly negative effect on investment of small firms. We also find that lending 
attitude of financial institutions did affect investment behavior irrespective of firm size. 
The impact of lending attitude on investment is notably large for 1998 labeled “credit 
crunch.”         
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1. Introduction 
     Financial liberalization in the 80s prompted Japanese large firms in 
manufacturing industries to shift from bank borrowing to direct financing in capital 
market. On the other hand, small firms, especially in nonmanufacturing industries, 
increased borrowings enormously, mostly collateralized by land. However, land price 
kept on falling in the 90s, which plunged a number of firms into insolvency. Looking at 
the problem from the lender’s side, the loans they made became non-performing and 
caused severe damage to the bank’s balance sheet.  
It is often argued that massive debt outstanding in the corporate sector and the 
associated bad loan problems are the main cause of long stagnancy of the Japanese 
economy in the 90s. The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of financial 
distress on the real economy quantitatively. Specifically we estimate the extent to which 
firm’s investment is affected by high leverage in the corporate sector and bad loan 
problems in the banking sector.  
     There are three features in this study. First of all, we analyze the relationship 
between debt accumulation and investment using the firm-level data. The micro data set 
we utilize is taken from the Annual Report of Financial Statements of Incorporated 
Business or Hojin Kigyo Tokei Nenpo of the Ministry of Finance. It includes not only 
large firms listed in stock exchange but also unlisted small firms. Since small firms are 
more bank-dependent, investment of small firms might be affected more sensitively by 
debt outstanding of their own and bad loan problem of banking sector. The sample 
period covers the period of 1993 to 1998 that includes the financial turmoil labeled 
“credit crunch” in Japan. There are none that investigate investment behavior by 
utilizing firm-level data including small firms. 
     Secondly, we deal with not only financial leverage in the corporate sector but also 
bad loan problems in the banking sector. Debt accumulation in the corporate sector 
might raise the firm’s borrowing cost, while lingering bad loans in the bank’s balance 
sheet might lead to a reduction of bank loans, which might directly affect the investment 
expenditure of bank-dependent firms. Investigation into these two problems 
simultaneously has important policy implications. If high leverage is found to be a 
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significant factor to affect investment, policy prescriptions to speed up the restructuring 
of firm’s balance sheet will be needed. On the other hand, if bad loan problems turn out 
to affect investment expenditure, wipeout of bad loans will be an urgent agenda for 
policymakers.  
     Thirdly, it is quite difficult to estimate the effect of loan supply on investment 
from observed data of bank loans due to the identification problem of supply and 
demand conditions. Therefore it is necessary to select the variable purely representing 
the supply condition of loans. Fortunately the Bank of Japan Tankan (Short-term 
Economic Survey of Corporations) records the diffusion index of ‘banks’ willingness to 
lend’ that can be a good proxy of the supply condition of loans. The data is available by 
industry and firm size, so that it is possible to test whether the impact of supply 
conditions of loans on investment varies across firms with different size. Motonishi and 
Yoshikawa (1999) is the first to estimate the investment function with this diffusion 
index as one of the explanatory variables to estimate the effect of credit crunch on 
investment. They use the aggregated data and this study is the first attempt to use the 
same approach to firm-level data.                             
     We preview the main findings of this study. First the firm’s ratio of debt to total 
asset exerts a significantly negative effect on investment for small firms. Furthermore 
the effect of debt on investment is statistically smaller for large firms. This finding lends 
support to the debt overhang argument that lingering debt chokes off new investment. It 
is also consistent with the asymmetric information literature that external finance 
premium is inversely associated with the collateralized net worth relative to loan size. 
Secondly, the lending attitude of financial institutions has significant effect on 
investment irrespective of firm size. It implies that bank health is important for 
investment activities of large firms as well as small firms that are bank-dependent. This 
finding is consistent with the work of Gibson(1995 and 1997) and Kang and 
Stulz(2000) that are based on micro data of large listed companies. The effect of lending 
attitude of financial institutions on investment is notably large for 1998 often identified 
as the year of credit crunch.       
This paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical and 
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empirical literature on the impact of financial distress on investment. Section 3 specifies 
investment function to be estimated and explains the data set used for empirical analysis. 
Section 4 explains the estimation results of investment function and discusses the 
implications derived from the estimation results. Section 5 gives concluding remarks. 
         
2. Financial Distress and Investment: Theory and Evidence 
     Before proceeding to the formal analysis, we review the theoretical arguments 
and empirical evidence in Japan how the balance sheet conditions of banks as well as 
firms affect corporate investment. It is well known that the balance sheet conditions of 
debtor affect the cost of raising external funds under capital market imperfections. 
When there exists asymmetric information between debtors and creditors, it will drive a 
wedge between the cost of external finance and internal finance, called external finance 
premium. External finance premium reflects the creditor’s cost of collecting the debtor’s 
information and monitoring the debtor’s behavior and the cost arising from lemon 
problem or moral hazard problem. The premium for external funds influences the cost 
of external funds and thereby affects economic activities of the debtor.  
The importance of this view has been frequently stressed in investment literature 
since it cast serious doubt on the celebrated Modigliani-Miller theorem that the financial 
policy is irrelevant in investment decision. Contrary to the verdict of the theorem, the 
cost of internal fund is lower than that of external fund and thus investment is 
influenced by the availability of internal fund.1 Furthermore, the external finance 
premium is inversely associated with the borrower’s collateralizable net worth relative 
to the loan. An adverse shock to the borrower’s net worth increases the external finance 
premium and reduces borrowings as well as investment.2  Note that the external 
finance premium is not equally imposed on borrowers. The external finance premium 
might be higher for small borrowers for several reasons. First, large borrowers have 
large collateralizable net worth that helps to diversify unobservable idiosyncratic risk, 
while small borrowers do not. 3 Secondly, as is discussed below, a number of large 
firms in Japan belong to industry groups known as keiretsu, where main bank plays a 
central role in mitigating the informational asymmetry between lenders and borrowers.  
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Another channel through which corporate debt affects investment is by creating 
debt overhang. Debt overhang is defined as deterrence of new investment by debt 
outstanding. It occurs when the debt outstanding is greater than the net present value of 
investment project since the benefits from new investment will go to the existing 
creditors rather than to the new investors. 4    
It is often pointed out that the damaged balance sheet of borrowers is one of the 
factors to explain the long stagnancy of investment by Japanese firms in the 90s. The 
story goes as follows. The borrowing of Japanese firms increased enormously in the late 
80s secured by land. Land used to be perfect for collateral in Japan under the 
expectation that the land price would never fall. In other words land can be a very useful 
device to reduce the external finance premium. In fact, based upon the aggregated 
time-series data, Ogawa et al. (1996) finds that the external finance premium is reduced 
by appreciation of land value in the late 80s for non-manufacturing industries that are 
composed of a number of small firms.5 Contrary to the expectations, land price fell 
sharply in the 90s, which eroded the firm’s collateralizable net worth with the loan 
outstanding almost intact, which raised the external finance premium considerably and 
thereby decreased investment. Moreover the debt overhang argument above lends 
further support to the stagnancy of new investment due to excessive debt outstanding in 
the corporate sector.   
 Recently attention has been also paid to the balance sheet of banks as one of the 
important determinants to affect the real activities of firms. 6  Banks play an 
intermediary role in mitigating asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. 
Banks examine the request for loans by borrowers by collecting the information of 
borrowers and monitor the borrowers so that the contract may be fulfilled. However, if 
there are a large number of lenders, free-rider problem discourages individual banks 
from monitoring the borrowers. Thus a single “delegated monitor” can conserve on 
aggregate monitoring costs.7 In particular the saving of monitoring cost is large for 
small and medium-sized firms for which there are few alternative ways of raising 
external funds.  
It is also noted that in Japan institutional device called main bank system is potent 
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in narrowing the informational asymmetry between lenders and borrowers. Information 
of borrowers is accumulated in main banks through long-term, stable relationships of 
firms with their main banks. Moreover, bank employees often hold management 
positions in the financially troubled firms for the purpose of direct monitoring.8 
However, note that accumulation of borrower’s information into a single bank 
creates an informational monopoly with respect to its client. This lock-in effect makes it 
difficult for borrowers to switch lenders.9   
If a shock to the bank’s balance sheet affects lending, it will influence the real 
activities of bank-dependent borrowers. Suppose that an adverse shock hits the bank’s 
balance sheet. It raises the cost of external finance for the bank for the same reason as 
was discussed in the case of non-financial firm and thereby restrains the bank’s lending 
activity. Then it will lead to aggravation of the real activities of the bank-dependent 
borrowers.         
    Empirical studies on the effects of balance sheet shock on bank lending have 
mainly examined two types shocks on the bank’s balance sheet. One type of shock is 
monetary policy shock. Kashyap and Stein(1995,2000) examine how the monetary 
policy change affects the bank’s lending. They find that the response of lending to the 
monetary policy change varies across banks with different attributes. The impact of 
monetary policy on lending activities is more pronounced for smaller banks with less 
liquid balance sheets.  
Another strand of research examines the causes of contraction of bank lending in 
the period labeled “credit crunch.“ It is not hard to identify the period of credit crunch in 
several countries. For instance, the early 90s in the US has been labeled credit crunch 
and a number of hypotheses on the decline in bank credit have been advocated and 
tested. Among them include the shocks that affect bank capital, such as implementation 
of the Basel-Accord risk-based capital standards, depletion of bank capital from loan 
loss experiences in the late 80s. 10          
     As for Japan, there are also similar studies that examine whether the shocks to 
bank capital affect lending behavior of banks. In Japan the late 90s is often identified as 
the period of credit crunch when large financial institutions went into bankruptcy due to 
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severe bad loan problems. Yoshikawa et al. (1994) tests whether the bad loan problem 
led to contraction of bank credit to small firms and found no correlation between the 
level of bad loan and bank lending. Peek and Rosengren(1997) showed that contraction 
of bank lending by Japanese banks in the US resulted from the binding risk-based 
capital requirements associated with the Japanese market decline. Honda (1996), Ito and 
Sasaki (1998), and Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000) analyze the effect of risk-based capital 
requirements on bank lending. They found that the introduction of risk-based capital 
requirements affects bank lending of city banks. Woo(1999) found a positive and 
statistically significant correlation between bank capital and lending growth in 1997 and 
concludes that the shortage of bank capital is mainly responsible for contraction of bank 
lending.  
     Combining the evidence that the shocks to bank’s balance sheet affects lending 
behavior with the existence of bank-dependent borrowers, it follows that the balance 
sheet conditions of banks influence the real activities of firms.  
Gibson(1995 and 1997) and Kang and Stulz(2000) conduct direct tests of the 
impact of bank health on investment activities. The former studies found that the impact 
of bank health on investment was small, while the latter found that more 
bank-dependent firms invested less in early 90s. Note that these two studies are likely to  
underestimate the impact of bank health on investment since they use individual firm 
data listed in Tokyo Stock Exchange. Those firms are relatively large and not 
necessarily bank-dependent borrowers.   
     Motonishi and Yoshikawa (1999) and Ogawa and Kitasaka (2000) show that bank 
lending exerts a significant effect on investment. Using the Bank of Japan diffusion 
index of ‘banks’ willingness to lend,’ Motonishi and Yoshikawa obtain the evidence that 
bank lending is a significant determinant of business investment of small firms, but not 
large firms. Ogawa and Kitasaka also show that expenditures on fixed investment are  
sensitively affected by bank loans for small firms that do not have close substitutes of 
bank loans. Note that the empirical evidence of these two studies is based on the 
aggregated data.  
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3. Specification of Investment Function and Data Set Description  
Specification of Investment Function 
     The basic investment function to be estimated is a q-type investment function 
with the variables representing the degree of financial distress. The main driving force 
of investment is marginal q ( Mq ), present discounted value of maximized profit rate 
divided by the investment goods price. In other words, the marginal q is defined as: 
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We also add the cash flow variable (CFLOW) to measure the availability of internal 
funds to the explanatory variables. Under asymmetric information between lenders and 
borrowers, it is expected that cash flow will exert a positive effect on investment.11     
     There are two explanatory variables regarding the severity of financial distress. 
One is related to the firm’s balance sheet condition and is represented by the debt size 
relative to total asset (DEBT). Higher debt-asset ratio implies a higher cost of external 
finance. It might also create debt overhang. Both will decrease investment. The other is 
bank’s willingness to lend (LEND). The adverse shock such as bad loan withers the 
bank’s willingness to lend and hence will reduce investment expenditure of 
bank-dependent borrowers.         
     As was discussed in the previous section, it is quite plausible that the asymmetric 
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information problem is more severe for small and medium-sized firms than for large 
firms. Therefore it might be the case that investment of small and medium-sized firms is 
more sensitive to the degree of financial distress. To account for the differential impact 
of financial distress on investment, we introduce two dummy variables on the firm size. 
One dummy (DUMMY1) takes unity when the firm’s equity capital is between one 
hundred million yen and one billion yen and zero otherwise. The other dummy 
(DUMMY2) takes unity when the firm’s equity capital is above one billion yen and zero 
otherwise. Then we add the cross terms of two dummy variables with each explanatory 
variable. This specification takes into consideration the possibility that the coefficient 
estimates vary across three different firm groups, each of which corresponds to small, 
medium, and large firm group, respectively. The basic investment function to be 
estimated is written as follows: 
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where tI : gross investment in period t 
                        1−tK ：capital stock at the end of t-1 period 
                        tu : disturbance term in period t 
 
Data Set Description 
     The firm data set we use is taken from the Annual Report of Financial Statements 
of Incorporated Business or Hojin Kigyo Tokei Nenpo (abbreviated as ARFS) of the 
Ministry of Finance. It records individual items of firms’ balance sheet as well as profit 
and loss statement. The virtue of this data set is an extensive coverage of corporations 
with a variety of firm size for all the industries except financial and insurance industries. 
The coverage of firms is much wider than the firm database provided by NIKKEI and 
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Development Bank of Japan, both of which include only the listed large firms.  
     The sample period is from the fiscal year of 1993 to 1998 and covers the period 
of financial turbulence in 1997 and 1998. The number of observations in the original 
data set is 26040, 26218, 26594, 25691, 25394, and 25505 from 1993 to 1998, 
respectively. Unfortunately there is no identifying the sampled firms, so that the data set 
cannot be utilized as a panel data set. However the end-of-period value as well as the 
beginning-of-period value of each balance sheet item is available for each firm. 
Therefore we can compute the flow values from the stock values for individual firms.    
Now we describe the procedure to construct the variables used in estimation. 
Gross investment )( tI  is defined as the increment of tangible fixed asset excluding 
land, with depreciation allowance added, divided by investment goods deflator. Capital 
stock )( tK  is defined as the tangible fixed asset excluding land divided by the 
investment goods deflator in the year when the capital stock was installed. The 
installation year of the capital stock is identified by the information of the average years 
elapsed since installation, which is taken from the 1998 White Paper on the Japanese 
Economy. Cash flow )( tCFLOW is defined as net income plus depreciation allowance 
minus bonus to directors, and dividends including interim dividends. The real cash flow 
is obtained by dividing the cash flow by the value-added deflator of the industry the 
firm belongs to. The debt-asset ratio )( 1−tDEBT  is defined as the ratio of borrowings 
and bonds payable to total assets at the end of period t-1. The lending attitude of 
financial institutions )( tLEND is taken from the Short-term Economic Survey of All 
Enterprises called Tankan, conducted by the Bank of Japan. It is the diffusion index and 
represents the proportion of entrepreneurs feeling the present lending attitude of 
financial institutions to be “accommodative” minus those feeling the present lending 
attitude of financial institutions to be “severe”. The data are available by industries and 
three firm-size groups (small, medium and large firm group) classified by regular 
employees.12  
In constructing the marginal q )( tMq series special attention should be paid to 
the stochastic property of the two underlying factors: discount rate )( tr  and profit rate 
)( tπ . The discount rate is computed as the interest and discount paid divided by the sum 
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of discount of notes receivable, short-term loans payable, long-term loans payable and 
bonds payable. The profit rate is defined as the ratio of operating profit to the 
beginning-of-period capital stock. It is assumed that the discount rate and the profit rate 
follow random walk independently. In other words,  
 
              11 ++ += ttt urr        (3) 
              11 ++ += ttt vππ        (4) 
                  where 11, ++ tt vu ：stationary white noise 
 
Then it can be shown that the marginal q is simply written as  
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The depreciation rate δ  is assumed to be 7.72 % per annum. 13  
We cannot utilize all the observations mainly due to unavailability of balance 
sheet items. Therefore we choose the observations for estimation based on the following 
three criteria. First, we exclude the firms in agriculture, forestry, fishery and mining 
industries since the data of lending attitude of financial institution are not available for 
these industries. We also exclude the firms in electric power and gas industries due to 
regulatory nature of these industries. Secondly, some of the balance sheet items are 
unreported for a number of firms, notably small firms. Therefore we choose only the 
firms that report the following balance sheet items: tangible fixed asset excluding land 
and construction in progress, total assets, equity capital, sales, depreciation allowance, 
and number of employees. Thirdly, we retain the observations that satisfy all of the 
following conditions: 1) absolute value of the ratio of investment to the 
beginning-of-period capital stock is less than unity  2) absolute value of the ratio of 
cash flow to the beginning-of-period capital stock is less than 5   3) the ratio of sales 
to the beginning-of-period capital stock is less than 50   4) marginal q is less than 10    
5) the ratio of borrowings and bonds to total assets is less than unity  6) the sum of 
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interest and discount paid is positive.    
     The information of the sample finally chosen is shown in Table 1. The figures in 
parentheses at the bottom row show the proportion of the observations used for 
estimation out of total observations. It is the lowest for small firm group, varying from 
34%(1998) to 41.7%(1993), while it is the highest for large firm group, from 
68.2%(1996) to 72.6%(1993). It is in between for medium firm group. The 
distributional information of the sampled firms across industries is also shown in the 
table. The proportion of manufacturing firms hovers around 40% for small and medium 
firm groups. On the other hand it is much higher for large firm group, varying from 
51.1%(1998) to 55.8%(1993). The proportion of firms in construction industry is 
notably high around 16% for small firm group, while it is at most 6% for medium and 
large firm groups. In the medium firm group the proportion of firms in service 
industries is second highest (around 15%) to that in manufacturing industries.             
     Table 2 shows the median and mean values of gross investment, capital stock and 
total assets for the sample firms. The mean value is much higher than the median value 
for all the variables, implying that the distribution of firms is skewed to the right. The 
median of capital stock and total assets of large (medium) firms is 80 to 100 (17 to 20) 
times larger than that of small firms. As for the median of gross investment of large 
(medium) firms, it is 180 to 240 (24 to 32) times larger than that of small firms.  
     Figure 1 to 4 depicts the median values of gross investment rate, ratio of cash 
flow to the beginning-of-period capital stock, marginal q, and debt-asset ratio for each 
firm group from 1993 to 1998. The gross investment rate is always highest for large 
firm group, followed by medium firm group. The trend of the gross investment rate is 
common to all the firm groups. The gross investment rate increases gradually up to 
1997 and declines in 1998. The ratio of cash flow to capital stock is highest for small 
firm group, though it declines gradually over time. This ratio is rather stable for medium 
and large firm groups. We observe the common declining trend of marginal q from 1996 
to 1998 for every firm group. From 1993 to 1996 the marginal q exhibits an increasing 
trend for large firm group, although it is rather stable for small and medium firm groups.  
The debt-asset ratio is highest for small firm group, ranging from 0.47 (1993) to 
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0.51(1996,1998), followed by medium firm group hovering around 0.42 to 0.43. It is by 
far lowest for large firm group from 0.31(1997) to 0.33(1994). The debt-asset ratio 
exhibits a gradual declining trend for large firm group, while it increases slightly over 
time for small and medium firm groups.  
     Figure 5 shows the diffusion index of lending attitude of financial institutions for 
three firm groups in the period of 1993 to 1999. It is clear that the lending attitude 
becomes very severe in the last quarter of 1997. Note that large financial institutions 
such as Yamaichi Securities and The Hokkaido Takushoku Bank went into bankruptcy 
on November in 1997. The proportion of “severe” respondents has by far exceeded that 
of “ accommodative” respondents since the first quarter of 1998.  
 
4. Estimation Results of Investment Function and Their Implications  
Estimation Results of Basic Investment Function 
     Equation 2 is estimated separately for each year since the lending attitude of 
financial institutions changed drastically across years, as was seen in the previous 
section, and the response of investment to lending attitude might change accordingly. 
Dummy variables to represent individual industry effect are added to the explanatory 
variables in estimation. Estimation results of q-type investment function are shown in 
Table 3. It is found that the investment behavior is quite different across different size 
group. In none of the sample years the marginal q exerts a significantly positive effect 
on investment for small firm group. On the other hand, the effect of marginal q on 
investment for large firm group is statistically larger than that for small firm group for 
all the sample years. The total effect of marginal q on investment for large firm group as 
well as medium firm group is computed by adding the coefficient estimate of the cross 
term of marginal q with firm group dummy to that of marginal q. They are shown in 
Table 4. Note that the effect of marginal q on investment for large firm group is positive 
for all the sample years. This is quite contrasted with the negative marginal q 
coefficients of small firm group for all the sample years. The effect of marginal q on 
investment for medium firm group is also significantly larger than that for small firm 
group for 1993, 1994, 1996 and 1997. The total effect of marginal q on investment for 
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medium firm group is also positive for all the sample years.  
     Contrary to the role of marginal q in investment behavior, cash flow exerts a 
significantly positive effect on investment for small firm group for all the sample years.  
The effect of cash flow on investment for large firm group is significantly lower than 
that for small firm group for all the sample years. Table 5 shows the total effect of cash 
flow on investment. The size of cash flow coefficients varies from 0.1354 (1998) to 
0.2279 (1993) for small firm group, while it is only from 0.0073 (1998) to 0.0890 
(1996) for large firm group. 
     As for the effect of debt-asset ratio on investment, it is significantly negative for 
small firm group for all the sample years. It is consistent with debt overhang hypothesis 
and the theoretical verdict from asymmetric information literature that higher debt-asset 
ratio raises the cost of external finance and hence decreases investment. Note that the 
effect of debt-asset ratio on investment is significantly smaller for large firm group for 
1993, 1994, 1995 and 1997. The total effect of debt-asset ratio on investment, shown in 
Table 6, varies from –0.1069(1997) to –0.0668(1998) for small firm group, while it is 
–0.0878 (1998) to –0.0240 (1993). Our findings indicate that the agency problem is 
particularly severe for small firms that have few alternative ways other than bank loans 
to finance investment.  
    Lending attitude of financial institutions has significantly positive effects on 
investment of small firm group for all the sample years. Furthermore, the cross terms of 
the firm size dummy with the lending attitude variable are insignificant for most of the 
cases. In fact no systematic difference can be detected from total effects of lending 
attitude on investment for three firm groups classified by firm size, shown in Table 7, 
except for 1997 and 1998. It implies that lending attitude of financial institutions does 
influence firm’s investment activities irrespective of firm size. Small and medium firms 
are mostly bank-dependent, so that it is quite plausible that lending attitude of financial 
institutions has significant effect on investment. However, our results show that it is also 
the case with large firm group. This finding supports the evidence by Gibson(1995 and 
1997) and Kang and Stulz(2000) that bank health is important for investment of listed 
firms. As was shown in Figure 5, the lending attitude of financial institutions was 
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accommodative during 1993 to 1996. Even under such accommodative circumstances, 
lending attitude of financial institutions did matter for investment. Then it is expected 
that lending attitude of financial institutions would be all the more important for 
investment activities for the period of 1997 and 1998 labeled “credit crunch” when the 
bank health was impaired by mounting non-performing loans and the steep drop in 
Japanese stock prices, which turned lending attitude of financial institutions very severe. 
In fact our evidence shows that this is the case. The effect of lending attitude on 
investment of small firm group jumped to 0.2285 in 1998 from 0.0842 in 1997. 
However, the cross terms of firm size dummy with lending attitude in 1998 are 
significantly negative for medium and large firm groups, indicating that the effect of 
lending attitude on investment was somewhat mitigated for larger firm groups.  
 
Robustness of Findings 
     We obtained the findings that firm’s debt-asset ratio as well as lending attitude of 
financial institutions did affect the firm’s investment activities. We will show that these 
findings are quite robust with respect to specification of investment function. 
Investment function is re-estimated under two different specifications to reexamine the 
effects of debt-asset ratio and lending attitude of financial institutions on investment.  
     First of all, we estimate the accelerator-type investment function where the 
marginal q variable is replaced by the sales variable. The estimation results are shown in 
Table 8. The debt-asset ratio exerts a significantly negative effect on investment for 
small firm group in all the sample years. Moreover, the effect of debt-asset ratio on 
investment is significantly less for large firm group in 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1997. The 
lending attitude of financial institutions also affects investment of small firm group in a 
significantly negative manner for all the sample years. The magnitude of the effect of 
lending attitude on investment is not discernibly different between small firm group and 
larger firm groups except for a few years. In 1998 the effect of lending attitude on 
investment becomes notably large for small firm group, while it is significantly less for 
medium and large firm groups.  
     In the second specification of investment function, we specify the coefficient of 
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each variable as a function of firm size, represented by the logarithm of total asset. In 
the previous specifications we incorporated into the analysis the possibility that the 
coefficients varied discontinuously depending on the firm’s equity capital. Here it is 
assumed that the coefficients change continuously as a function of the logarithm of 
firm’s total asset. Specifically investment function is written as follows:   
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 (6) 
                  
where 1−tTASSET : total asset of firm at the end of period t-1 
 
     The estimation results of equation 6 are shown in Table 9. It is found that the 
cross term of firm size with debt-asset ratio is significantly positive in all the sample 
years but 1998. It implies that the effect of debt-asset ratio on investment decreases as 
the firm becomes larger. To put it differently, the impact of debt burden on investment  
would be significantly less for larger firms. On the other hand, the effect of lending 
attitude of financial institutions on investment depends inversely on firm size in a 
significant manner only in half of the sample years or 1993, 1995 and 1998.  
     To evaluate the impact of debt-asset ratio and lending attitude of financial 
institutions on investment quantitatively under three different specifications of 
investment function, we make comparison of the marginal effect of debt-asset ratio and 
lending attitude of financial institutions on investment for small, medium and large firm 
groups, respectively. Under the last specification of investment function, the marginal 
effect depends on the firm’s total asset, so that we compute the average of the marginal 
effects for each firm group classified by firm’s equity capital. The marginal coefficients 
under three different specifications are shown in Table 10 and 11. Table 10 shows the 
marginal effects of debt-asset ratio on investment. They are quite alike in terms of 
magnitude across different specifications of investment function. They are the largest 
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for small firm group and the smallest for large firm group. Common to each 
specification is an increasing trend in absolute value of the effect of debt-asset on 
investment for large firm group, indicating that the impact of debt burden on investment 
is increasing for large firm group over the sample period. 
     The marginal effects of lending attitude of financial institutions on investment are 
shown in Table 11. Here we also observe that the magnitude of the marginal effects is 
quite alike across different specifications of investment function for small and medium 
firm groups. The spike of the coefficient estimate in 1998 is commonly observed for 
small firm group. For large firm group, the size of marginal effects is similar under the 
two specifications where the size effect is captured by the dummy variables for firm’s 
equity capital. However, when the size effect is specified as a function of the logarithm 
of firm’s total asset, the marginal effects become less than those under the other 
specifications.  
     To sum up, our findings that debt-asset ratio as well as lending attitude of 
financial institutions does affect firm’s investment behavior is quite robust irrespective 
of the specification of investment function.  
 
Impact of “Credit Crunch” on Investment: Quantitative Evaluation 
     It is frequently asserted that the “credit crunch” in the late 90s, triggered by the 
bankruptcy of large financial institutions, is mainly responsible for the stagnancy of 
corporate investment. We evaluate this assertion based on the coefficient estimates of 
investment function obtained above in two different ways.  
Firstly, we compute to what extent investment is increased when the proportion 
of accommodative respondents rises by 10 percentage points. Table 12 shows annually 
by how much investment will increase for each firm group in percentage terms. The 
figures are based on the specification of marginal q-type investment function where firm 
size effect is represented by the dummy variables for firm’s equity capital. They are 
aggregated values of all the sample firms. Investment of small firm group increases by 
23.45% in 1998, which is far larger than any other year. Percentage increase of 
investment is also largest in 1998 for medium firm group (7.41%). On the other hand, 
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the percentage increase of investment for large firm group is only 3.52% in 1998, which 
is the second smallest in the sample years.       
     The second exercise computes by how much investment would have been 
increased if the financial institutions in 1998 had made loans under the lending attitude 
in 1996. The results are shown in Table 13. The table shows the increment of investment 
by industry and firm size in percentage terms. The investment of small firm group 
would have increased by as much as 84.9%. It should be noted that the pattern of 
investment increment is not uniform across industries. The percentage increase of 
investment is notably high for real estate (270.1%), transportation and communication 
(185.9%) and wholesale trade (129.9%), while it is lowest for manufacturing industry 
(59.8%). The investment of medium firm group would have increased by 34.5%. The 
percentage increase of investment is high for real estate (84.7%), construction (65.1%) 
and wholesale trade (63.7%), while it is the second lowest for manufacturing industry 
(36.3%). For large firm group the percentage increase of investment is lowest (18.8%) 
among three firm groups. The percentage increase of investment is high for real estate 
(50.7%) and construction (47.0%). Large increase of investment in real estate and 
construction industries is common to all the firm groups. It is shown that investment in 
total would have increased by 21.3% in 1998 under accommodative attitude of financial 
institutions in 1996. If the aggregate investment had increased by this proportion, the 
increment of investment in 1998 would amount to 16361.4 billion yen. Then the GDP 
growth rate in 1998 would have been 1.4% instead of –1.9%. Therefore it is concluded 
that the impact of “credit crunch” in the late 90s on corporate investment was 
substantial.  
 
5.Concluding Remarks 
     Mounting debt in the corporate sector and related bad loan problems of the 
financial sector had been a big concern for the domestic economists as well as abroad. It 
is frequently asserted that this is the main cause of the stagnancy of the Japanese 
economy. We made an attempt to evaluate this assertion rigorously by estimating the 
investment function. The novelty of this study is an empirical examination of the 
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association of investment with financial distress based on the firm-level data in the 90s 
including unlisted small firms. This point is very important since it is often argued that 
what suffers most from financial distress is small firms rather than large firms. However 
existing empirical literature along this line failed to shed light on this aspect due to the 
accessibility to the micro data of small firms.  
     Our main findings are that financial distress seriously hurt firm’s investment 
behavior in the 90s. Lingering debt on the corporate sector exerted a negative effect on 
investment of small firms on the one hand, and severe lending attitude of financial 
institutions also deterred investment of small firms on the other hand. Furthermore, we 
also find that the impact of “credit crunch” in the late 90s had non-negligible effect on 
aggregate investment. A number of policy prescriptions have been proposed to boost up 
the Japanese economy. Our evidence indicates that serious tackle of mounting debt in 
the corporate sector and non-performing loans in the financial sector deserves first 
priority in policy agenda.  
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Footnotes 
 
1 There is a growing body of literature on this issue. See Hubbard (1998) for a survey of investment 
behavior under capital market imperfections.  
 
2 Empirical support for negative effect of firm leverage on investment is shown in Lang et al.(1996). 
Cantor(1990) and Calomiris et al.(1997) show in a slightly different context that investment of 
leverage firm is more responsive to sales and cash flow.  
 
3 Gertler and Gilchrist (1993) emphasizes that asymmetric information problem is more severe for 
small firms than for large firms. See Berger and Udell (1998) for a comprehensive survey of small 
business finance.  
 
4 See Myers(1977) and Hart(1995) for more detailed discussion on debt overhang. 
 
5 Suzuki and Ogawa (1997) and Ogawa and Suzuki (1998) also confirm the positive dependence of 
corporate investment on land asset for large, listed corporations by firm-level panel data.  
 
6 Kashyap and Stein (1994) survey theoretical and empirical studies that relate to the propagation 
mechanism of monetary policy shock to bank lending. See also Hubbard(1995), Bernanke and 
Gertler(1995) and Mishkin(1996) for comprehensive survey of monetary transmission mechanism.    
   
7 See Diamond (1984) and Boyd and Prescott (1986) for more details on delegated monitoring.  
 
8 Hoshi et al. (1991) obtains the evidence that the firms affiliated with main bank enjoy lower 
external finance premium than independent firms using the micro data of firms.    
 
9 See Sharpe(1990) and Rajan(1992) for the theoretical analysis of the association of banking 
relationship with information monopoly.  
 
10 To mention a few, Bernanke and Lown(1991), Berger and Udell(1994), Peek and Rosengren 
(1995) , and Hancock and Wilcox(1998) analyze the effect of credit crunch on bank lending. 
  
11 There is a caveat on the interpretation of cash flow coefficient. Kaplan and Zingales(1997) argue 
that positive correlation of cash flow with investment is not the evidence of liquidity constrain, but 
simply reflects the future investment opportunities not covered by marginal q.   
 
12 The diffusion index of lending attitude of financial institutions is available on a quarterly basis. In 
estimating investment functions, we average out the quarterly data into the annual base.  
 
13 The depreciation rate is taken from TableA-2 in Ogawa et al. (1994). 
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Table 3 Estimation Results of q-type Investment Functions
Variables 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Marginal q -0.0063*** -0.0034* -0.0005 -0.0009 -0.0049*** -0.0003
(-3.95) (-1.82) (-0.26) (-0.44) (-2.60) (-0.13)
Dummy for medium
firms x Marginal q 0.0133*** 0.0065*** 0.0040 0.0051* 0.0057** 0.0036
 (6.39) (2.73) (1.56) (1.78) (2.28) (1.30)
Dummy for large firms x
Marginal q 0.0156*** 0.0125*** 0.0082*** 0.0054* 0.0133*** 0.0096***
(6.83) (5.02) (3.16) (1.91) (5.23) (3.50)
Cash flow 0.2279*** 0.2030*** 0.1887*** 0.1590*** 0.1552*** 0.1354***
(10.99) (8.67) (7.67) (5.22) (5.88) (3.63)
Dummy for medium
firms x Cash flow -0.1708*** -0.0516 -0.0446 -0.0123 -0.0632* -0.0741*
(-6.38) (-1.61) (-1.19) (-0.28) (-1.72) (-1.65)
Dummy for large firms x
Cash flow -0.2121*** -0.1448*** -0.1435*** -0.0700* -0.1150*** -0.1281***
(-6.88) (-4.38) (-3.81) (-1.65) (-3.24) (-3.30)
Debt ratio -0.0941*** -0.0862*** -0.1042*** -0.0805*** -0.1069*** -0.0668***
(-10.34) (-9.09) (-10.28) (-7.81) (-10.59) (-6.30)
Dummy for medium
firms x Debt ratio 0.0303*** 0.0091 0.0155 -0.0050 0.0203* -0.0136
 (2.98) (0.88) (1.38) (-0.43) (1.77) (-1.04)
Dummy for large firms x
Debt ratio 0.0701*** 0.0317** 0.0433*** 0.0076 0.0264** -0.0210
(5.42) (2.39) (3.11) (0.57) (2.07) (-1.38)
Lending attitude 0.1167** 0.0814** 0.1579*** 0.1743*** 0.0842** 0.2285***
(2.28) (2.43) (4.75) (5.33) (2.27) (5.81)
Dummy for medium
firms x Lending attitude -0.0066 -0.0370 -0.0604** -0.0432 -0.0670* -0.1001***
 (-0.16) (-1.17) (-2.02) (-1.46) (-1.82) (-3.07)
Dummy for large firms x
Lending attitude -0.0298 0.0142 -0.0385 0.0024 -0.0593 -0.1683***
(-0.0298) (0.39) (-1.20) (0.07) (-1.44) (-4.80)
Adjusted R-squared 0.0637 0.0911 0.0890 0.0947 0.0809 0.0726
Standard error 0.1909 0.1823 0.1877 0.1889 0.1885 0.1774
Notes: The figures in parentheses are t-values.
The coefficient estimates of constant term as well as industry dummy variables are suppressed.  
* significant at the 10% level
** significant at the 5% level
*** significant at the 1% level
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Table 8 Estimation Results of Accelerator-type Investment Functions
Variables 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Sales 0.00003 0.0013*** 0.0017*** 0.0009** 0.0015*** 0.0014***
(0.09) (2.93) (3.84) (2.01) (3.31) (2.74)
Dummy for medium
firms x Sales 0.0021*** -0.0002 -0.0009 0.0002 -0.0001 0.00001
 (3.99) (-0.38) (-1.61) (0.36) (-0.23) (0.05)
Dummy for large firms x
Sales 0.0027*** 0.0006 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0006 0.0009
(4.01) (0.92) (-0.13) (-0.19) (0.83) (1.33)
Cash flow 0.1950*** 0.1732*** 0.1625*** 0.1438*** 0.1103*** 0.1165***
(10.98) (9.13) (7.89) (5.63) (5.43) (3.79)
Dummy for medium
firms x Cash flow -0.1307*** -0.0132 -0.0059 0.0120 -0.0250 -0.0540
(-5.36) (-0.49) (-0.18) (0.31) (-0.81) (-1.39)
Dummy for large firms x
Cash flow -0.1565*** -0.0839*** -0.0989*** -0.0419 -0.0489 -0.0948***
(-5.62) (-2.79) (-2.83) (-1.09) (-1.55) (-2.89)
Debt ratio -0.0975*** -0.0867*** -0.1016*** -0.0801*** -0.1111*** -0.0643***
(-10.45) (-9.00) (-9.72) (-7.52) (-10.91) (-6.01)
Dummy for medium
firms x Debt ratio 0.0421*** 0.0155 0.0172 -0.0017 0.0282** -0.0140
 (4.09) (1.47) (1.52) (-0.14) (2.46) (-1.06)
Dummy for large firms x
Debt ratio 0.0796*** 0.0375*** 0.0437*** 0.0081 0.0443*** -0.0239
(5.99) (2.78) (3.08) (0.59) (3.40) (-1.56)
Lending attitude 0.1025** 0.0568* 0.1379*** 0.1644*** 0.0812** 0.2445***
(2.02) (1.71) (4.13) (5.02) (2.19) (6.29)
Dummy for medium
firms x Lending attitude -0.0108 -0.0074 -0.0239 -0.0275 -0.0645* -0.1170***
 (-0.26) (-0.23) (-0.76) (-0.90) (-1.75) (-3.61)
Dummy for large firms x
Lending attitude -0.0203 0.0689* 0.0099 0.0332 -0.0388 -0.2094***
(-0.44) (1.87) (0.28) (1.01) (-0.94) (-6.00)
Adjusted R-squared 0.0614 0.0899 0.0895 0.0945 0.0798 0.0721
Standard error 0.1911 0.1824 0.1876 0.1889 0.1890 0.1774
Notes: See the notes in Table 3.
Table 9 Estimation Results of q-type Investment Functions
           with Coefficients Specified as a Function of Firm Size 
Variables 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Marginal q -0.0384*** -0.0221*** -0.0124 -0.0087 -0.0198*** -0.0086
(-6.66) (-3.22) (-1.56) (-1.09) (-2.87) (-1.38)
Firm size x Marginal q 0.0028*** 0.0221*** 0.0011** 0.0007 0.0014*** 0.0009**
 (7.39) (3.72) (2.06) (1.44) (3.21) (2.19)
Cash flow 0.5121*** 0.3323*** 0.3167*** 0.1780 0.2182*** 0.2385***
(7.46) (4.23) (2.96) (1.59) (2.67) (3.18)
Firm size x Cash flow -0.0272*** -0.0123** -0.0127* -0.0028 -0.0081 -0.0116***
(-5.92) (-2.31) (-1.66) (-0.36) (-1.54) (-2.69)
Debt ratio -0.2183*** -0.1994*** -0.2418*** -0.1374*** -0.1937*** 0.0140
(-7.07) (-6.36) (-6.49) (-3.87) (-5.85) (0.37)
Firm size x Debt ratio 0.0101*** 0.0083*** 0.0103*** 0.0039* 0.0068*** -0.0063**
 (4.98) (4.12) (4.29) (1.69) (3.15) (-2.49)
Lending attitude 0.3028** 0.1909** 0.4161*** 0.2004** 0.1339 0.7465***
(2.32) (2.02) (4.65) (2.35) (1.19) (7.76)
Firm size x Lending attitude -0.0142* -0.0093 -0.0197*** -0.0046 -0.0074 -0.0391***
 (-1.91) (-1.61) (-3.84) (-0.92) (-1.07) (-7.18)
Adjusted R-squared 0.0601 0.0897 0.0874 0.0940 0.0793 0.0724
Standard error 0.1912 0.1824 0.1878 0.1889 0.1890 0.1774
Notes: See the notes in Table 3.
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Table 12  Increase of Investment When the Accommodative
               Respondents Increase by 10 Percentage Points
(%)
Small
firms
Medium
firms
Large
firms
1993 11.07 6.85 5.27
1994 7.03 3.09 6.31
1995 15.44 5.70 7.40
1996 12.77 6.84 9.72
1997 4.99 0.89 1.37
1998 23.45 7.41 3.52
  
Table 13  Effect of Credit Crunch in 1997-98
          on Investment 
(%)
Small
firms
Medium
firms
Large
firms
Manufacturing 59.8 36.3 17.7
Construction 88.9 65.1 47.0
Wholesale trade 129.9 63.7 29.3
Reatil trade 74.4 38.2 21.4
Real estate 270.1 84.7 50.7
Services 97.0 15.1 7.2
Transportation
 and communication 185.9 51.3 26.0
Total 84.9 34.5 18.8
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